03 | Competition
Killer acquisitions
03 | Competition
Killer acquisitions
Killer acquisitions involve a larger company acquiring a smaller innovative company to eliminate potential competition. These types of transactions are typically found in the technology and pharmaceuticals sectors, but they are not necessarily caught by the traditional merger thresholds as the innovative company may be below the usual jurisdictional thresholds.
The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCCA) addressed this regulatory gap by introducing: (i) a hybrid jurisdictional threshold and (ii) a merger reporting duty for large companies designated with Strategic Market Status (SMS).
The DMCCA introduces a mandatory and suspensory merger control regime for SMS firms
Hybrid jurisdictional threshold
The DMCCA made amendments to the UK merger control jurisdictional thresholds set out in the Enterprise Act 2002, by raising the threshold for the target's UK turnover to £100m (the turnover test). The share of supply test remains the same, which requires merging entities, together, to supply or acquire at least 25% of a particular category of type of goods or services of any kind in the UK. The DMCCA also introduced a new hybrid test to capture killer acquisitions. The hybrid test can be met by a single party (usually the acquirer): one party (the acquirer) needs to have a share of supply of at least 33% and a UK turnover of at least £350m and the other party (the target) needs to have a UK nexus. The hybrid test does not require any increment to its share of supply, unlike the share of supply test.
The DMCCA also introduced a new safe harbour which exempts a transaction from merger review where each party's UK turnover is less than £10m. The implementation of a de minimis threshold is in line with the 4Ps framework (pace, predictability, proportionality and process) of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), enabling the regulator to apply a proportionate approach to its merger review by focusing its resources on complex mergers which are likely to cause legitimate competition concerns, while shielding smaller businesses seeking to merge.
Merger reporting duty
Large tech companies generally have a higher likelihood of making killer acquisitions, primarily due to their extensive financial resources and the unique environment of competing in concentrated and rapidly evolving markets. The DMCCA introduced a mandatory and suspensory merger control regime for SMS firms (typically large digital platforms). SMS firms are required to report mergers involving targets with a UK presence where the transaction results in the SMS firm acquiring a certain level of shares or voting rights in the target and the total consideration is at least £25m. This early notification framework increases regulatory oversight and enables the CMA to scrutinise potentially anti-competitive mergers before they are completed.
The CMA has been encouraged by the Labour government to take a more pro-growth and pro-investment approach, particularly in relation to its merger review processes. The CMA has been revisiting and reworking its enforcement regime to fulfil this mandate (eg with the publication of updated Merger Assessment Guidelines in June 2026). In her February 2026 speech, Sarah Cardell clarified the CMA's approach of "applying a scalpel not a sledgehammer" to merger control and that "only a tiny handful of truly anti-competitive deals which cannot be effectively remedied operate as a blocker to growth or household prosperity". However, the CMA has also made it clear that it will continue to take appropriate enforcement action when required and prioritise high risk dynamics, such as killer acquisitions.